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Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Stable Family and
Threesome Roommates Problems⋆
Chien-Chung Huang
Dartmouth College
villars@cs.dartmouth.edu
Abstract. We investigate Knuth’s eleventh open question on stable matchings.
In the stable family problem, sets of women, men, and dogs are given, all of
whom state their preferences among the other two groups. The goal is to orga-
nize them into family units, so that no three of them have the incentive to desert
their assigned family members to form a new family. A similar problem, called
the threesome roommates problem, assumes that a group of persons, each with
their preferences among the combinations of two others, are to be partitioned into
triples. Similarly, the goal is to make sure that no three persons want to break up
with their assigned roommates.
Ng and Hirschberg were the first to investigate these two problems. In their for-
mulation, each participant provides a strictly-ordered list of all combinations.
They proved that under this scheme, both problems are NP-complete. Their pa-
per reviewers pointed out that their reduction exploits inconsistent preference lists
and they wonder whether these two problems remain NP-complete if preferences
are required to be consistent. We answer in the affirmative.
In order to give these two problems a broader outlook, we also consider the pos-
sibility that participants can express indifference, on the condition that the pref-
erence consistency has to be maintained. As an example, we propose a scheme in
which all participants submit two (or just one in the roommates case) lists ranking
the other two groups separately. The order of the combinations is decided by the
sum of their ordinal numbers. Combinations are tied when the sums are equal. By
introducing indifference, a hierarchy of stabilities can be defined. We prove that
all stability definitions lead to NP-completeness for existence of a stable match-
ing.
⋆ Dartmouth Computer Science Report 2007-598
1 Problem Definition
Knuth proposed twelve open questions on the stable matching problem [9]. The eleventh
question asks whether the well-studied stable marriage problem [4] can be generalized
to the case of three parties, women, men, and dogs. In this paper, we call this problem
the stable family problem and refer generically to all participants in this problem as
“players.” Roughly speaking, given sets of women, men, and dogs, all of whom state
their preferences among the other two groups, the goal is to organize them into family
units so that there is no blocking triple: three players each preferring one another to
their assigned family members. A problem in a similar vein, which we call the three-
some roommates problem, assumes that 3n students are to be assigned to the dormitory
bedrooms in some college. They state their preferences of the combinations of two other
persons. The goal is to partition them into sets of size 3. Such a partition (matching) is
said to be stable if no three persons each prefer the others to their assigned roommates.
As Knuth does not specify any precise definition of “preference” and “blocking
triples,” one can conceive a number of ways to define the two problems. One possi-
ble formulation is that each player submits a strictly-ordered preference list, ranking
all possible combinations that she/he/it can get in a matching. We call such a scheme
strictly-ordered-complete-list (SOCL) scheme. In this setting, Ng and Hirschberg [10]
proved that both problems are NP-complete.
At the end of their paper, Ng and Hirschberg mentioned that their reviewers pointed
out their reduction allows preference to be inconsistent. For example, man m might
rank (w1, d1) higher than (w2, d1), but he also ranks (w2, d2) higher than (w1, d2). In
other words, he does not consistently prefer woman w1 over woman w2 (nor the other
way around). Independently, Subramanian [11] gave an alternative NP-completeness
proof for stable family, but his reduction also uses inconsistent lists.
The reviewers of Ng and Hirschberg wondered whether these two problems remain
NP-complete if inconsistency is disallowed. To answer this open question and to mo-
tivate some variants problems we will define, we introduce the notion of preference
posets and simple lists. In stable family, assuming that each player has two simple lists
in which two different types of players are ranked separately, a preference poset is a
product poset of the two simple lists. In such a poset, the combination (w1, d1) pre-
cedes another combination (w2, d2) only if w1 ranks at least as high as w2 and d1 at
least as high as d2 in the simple lists. If neither combination precedes the other, they
are incomparable. Similarly, in threesome roommates, the preference poset is the prod-
uct poset of the one simple list with itself. By this notion, the question raised by the
reviewers of Ng and Hirschberg can be rephrased as follows. Under the SOCL scheme,
if every player has to submit a preference list which is a linear extension of her/his/its
preference poset, are the stable family and the threesome roommates still NP-complete?
We answer in the affirmative.
In an attempt to give these two problems a broader outlook, we then allow players
to express indifference by giving full preference lists containing ties. In particular, to
capture the spirit of maintaining consistency in the preferences, we stipulate that the full
list must be a relaxed linear extension of a preference poset: strict precedence order in
the poset has to be observed in the relaxed linear extension; only incomparable elements
in the poset can be tied.
We propose the following scheme to make the above concept concrete. Suppose that
a player submits two simple lists (or just one in the roommates case). We create a full
list, ranking the combinations based on the sums of their ordinal numbers. For example,
for man m, the combination of his rank-2 woman and rank-5 dog is as good as that of
his rank-4 woman and rank-3 dog; while both of them are inferior the combination of
his top-ranked woman and his top-ranked dog. We call such a scheme precedence-by-
ordinal-number (PON) scheme. The PON scheme produces full preference lists which
are relaxed linear extensions of preference posets. Also, one can envisage an even more
flexible scheme. For example, instead of giving “ranks,” the players can provide “rat-
ings” of other players. The order of the combinations can be decided by the sum of the
ratings; two combinations are tied only when the sums of their ratings are equivalent.
Setting theoretical concerns aside for a moment, the above schemes are probably more
practicable when n is large, because a player only has to provide lists of Θ(n) length,
while under the SOCL scheme, they have to give strictly ordered lists of size Θ(n2).
By allowing indifference, we can define 4 different types of blocking triples and,
based on them, build up a hierarchy of stabilities. (This hierarchy is similar to that
constructed by Irving in the context of 2-party stable matchings [7].)
– Weak Stable Matching: a blocking triple is one in which all three players of the
blocking triple strictly prefer the other two members in the triple over their assigned
family members (roommates).
– Strong Stable Matching: a blocking triple is one in which at least two players of
the blocking triple strictly prefer the other two players in the triple to their assigned
family members (roommates), while the remaining player can be indifferent or also
strictly prefer the other two players in the triple.
– Super Stable Matching: a blocking triple is one in which at least one player of
the blocking triple strictly prefers the other two players in the triple to her/his/its
assigned family members (roommates), while the remaining players can be indif-
ferent or also strictly prefer the other two players in the triple.
– Ultra Stable Matching: a blocking triple is one in which all three players in the
triple are at least indifferent to the others.
Note that if ties are not allowed in the full preference lists, i.e., the SOCL scheme,
then blocking triples can only be of degree 3. Thus there can be only one type of sta-
bility. For presentational reason, in this case, we refer to the stability under the SOCL
scheme as the weak stability.
Our Results and Paper Roadmap We will prove in the paper that, if full prefer-
ence lists are (relaxed) linear extensions of preference posets, the problem of deciding
whether weak/strong/super/ultra stable matchings exist is NP-complete in both the sta-
ble family problem and the threesome roommates problem. Our reduction techniques
are inspired by Ng and Hirschberg’s, although the consistency requirement in the pref-
erences makes our construction more involved. In presenting our result, instead of di-
rectly answering the open question posed by Ng and Hirschberg’s reviewers by studying
weak-stability, we make a detour to first study strong/super/ultra stability. Introducing
them first helps us to explain our intuition behind the more complex reduction for the
former problem.
As is well-known, the stable marriage and the stable roommates problems can
be solved in O(n2) time, by the Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] and by the Irving algo-
rithm [6], respectively. Unfortunately, our results, along with Ng and Hirschberg and
Subramanian’s, indicate that attempts to efficiently solve the stable matching problem
in generalized cases of three (or more) parties are unlikely to be fruitful. This is not
surprising, as in theoretical computer science, the fine line between P and NP is often
drawn between the numbers two and three.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we present necessary notation and
some basic lemmas on the properties of posets; Section 3 proves the NP-completeness
of strong/super/ultra stable matchings in the stable family problem under the PON
scheme; Section 4 presents a reduction to transform a stable family problem to a three-
some roommate problem, thereby establishing the NP-completeness of strong/super/ultra
stable matchings in the latter; Section 5 considers the SOCL scheme in threesome
roommates and exhibits another reduction to show the NP-completeness of (weak) sta-
ble matching, thereby answering the open question posed by the anonymous reviewers
of Ng and Hirschberg. Section 6 concludes and discusses related issues.
2 Preliminaries
We use M, W , D to indicate the sets of men, women, and dogs in stable family; the
students in threesome roommates are denoted as R. In stable family, Lg(p) denotes the
simple list of player p on the players of type g ∈ {M,W ,D}. For example LW(m) is
the simple list of man m among women W . In threesome roommates, we simply write
L(m), where m ∈ R, dropping the subscript.
In general, we use the notation≻ to denote the precedence order (in either posets or
in linear lists). For example, supposing that pi ranks higher than pj in the list l, we write
pi ≻l pj . In a posetQ, two elements qi, qj either one precedes the other, which we write
qi ≻Q qj or qj ≻Q qi, or they are incomparable, which is expressed as qi||Qqj . The
notation ≻ is also used to express explicitly the order of players in the simple lists. For
example, we write L(p) = q ≻ r ≻ · · · to show that player p prefers player q to player
r. Note also that the notation · · · denotes the remaining players in arbitrary order.
We say a blocking triple is of degree i, if i players strictly prefer the triple while the
remaining 3−i players are indifferent. Unless stated otherwise, in the article, when we
say some triple “blocks,” it is always a blocking triple of degree 3. We use the notation
rp(q) to indicate the rank of q on player p’s simple list.
A preference poset constructed from lists l1 and l2 is written as l1×l2. To be precise,
given lists l1 and l2 and the poset l1 × l2, supposing that {pi, pj}, {pi′ , pj′} ∈ l1 × l2,
then {pi, pj} ≻l1×l2 {pi′ , pj′} only if (1) pi ≻l1 pi′ , pj = pj′ , or (2) pj ≻l2 pj′ , pi =
pi′ , or (3) pi ≻l1 pi′ , pj ≻l2 pj′ . The notation pi(X) means an arbitrary permutation
of elements in the set X . Eπ(l1 × l2) is an arbitrary linear extension of the preference
poset l1 × l2.
In a poset, we call an element a pivot if in the linear extension of the poset we will
create, this element precedes all its incomparable elements. Any element can be a pivot,
as will be shown by the lemma below.
Lemma 1. Given any poset Q and any element q ∈ Q, there exists a linear extension l
of Q such that if q||Qq′, then q ≻l q′.
The next lemma will be useful when we present the reduction for the threesome
roommates problem.
Lemma 2. Let l be a strictly-ordered list. Suppose that l is decomposed into nonempty
contiguous sublists (l1, l2, · · · , lk) such that (1)
⋃k
i=1 li = l, (2) if e ≻li f , then e ≻l f ,
and (3) if e ∈ li, f ∈ lj , i < j, then e ≻l f . Then there exists a linear extension of l× l
such that all combinations drawn from {li, lj} precede all pairs drawn from {li′ , lj′},
provided that i ≤ j, i′ ≤ j′ and one of the following conditions holds (1) i < i′, (2)
i = i′, j < j′.
The proofs of the two lemmas can be found in the appendix.
3 Reducing Three-dimensional Matching to Stable Family
In this section, we focus on the NP-completeness of strong stable matching under the
PON scheme. Similar results hold for super stable and ultra stable matchings by a
straightforward argument and will be discussed at the end of this section.
Our reduction is from the three-dimensional matching problem, one of the 21 NP-
complete problems in Karp’s seminal paper [8]. The problem instance is given in the
form Υ = (M,W ,D, T ), where T ⊆ M ×W × D. The goal is to decide whether
a perfect matching M ⊆ T exists. This problem remains NP-complete even if every
player in M∪W ∪D appears exactly 2 or 3 times in the triples of T [5].
We first explain the intuition behind our reduction. Supposing that man mi ap-
pears in three triples (mi, wia, dia), (mi, wib, dib), (mi, wic, dic) in T , we create three
dopplegangers, mi1,mi2,mi3 in the derived stable family problem instance Υ ′. We
also create four garbage collectors, wgi1, d
g
i1, w
g
i2, d
g
i2. Each doppleganger mij puts a
woman-dog pair, with whom man mi shares a triple, and the garbage collectors on top
of his two simple lists. The goal of our design is that in a stable matching, exactly one
doppleganger will be matched to a woman-dog pair with whom mi shares a triple in T ,
while the other two dopplegangers will be matched to garbage collectors. In the case
that there are only two triples in T containing man mi, we artificially make a copy of
one of the triples, making the total number of triples three, and treat him as described
above.
Now, we will refer to the set of dopplegangers as M1,M2,M3, the set of garbage
collectors asWg1 ,W
g
2 ,D
g
1 ,D
g
2 and the original set of real women and real dogs asW ,D.
Collectively, we refer to them as X = M1∪M2∪M3∪Wg1 ∪W
g
2 ∪W∪D
g
1∪D
g
2∪D.
To realize our plan, we introduce two gadgets. The first is three sets of “dummy
players”:m#1 , w
#
1 , d
#
1 ,m
#
2 , w
#
2 , d
#
2 ,m
#
3 , w
#
3 , d
#
3 . Their preferences are such that they
must be matched to one another in a stable matching. To be precise, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
– LW(m
#
j ) = w
#
j ≻ · · · , LD(m
#
j ) = d
#
j ≻ · · ·
– LM(w
#
j ) = m
#
j ≻ · · · , LD(w
#
j ) = d
#
j ≻ · · ·
– LM(d
#
j ) = m
#
j ≻ · · · , LW(d
#
j ) = w
#
j ≻ · · ·
These nine dummy players are used to “pad” the preference lists of other players.
Their purpose will be clear shortly.
Another gadget we need is a set of “guard players” for each doppleganger in M1 ∪
M2∪M3. They will make sure that in a stable matching, a doppleganger mij will only
get a woman-dog pair with whom mi shares a triple in T or those garbage collectors.
As an example, consider the doppleganger mi1. He has six associated guard players,
m♭1i1 , w
♭1
i1 , d
♭1
i1 ,m
♭2
i1 , w
♭2
i1 , d
♭2
i1 and their preferences are summarized below:
– LW(mi1) = w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wia ≻ w
♭1
i1 ≻ w
♭2
i1 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ w
#
2 ≻ w
#
3 ≻ · · · ,
LD(mi1) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dia ≻ d
♭2
i1 ≻ d
♭1
i1 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ d
#
2 ≻ d
#
3 ≻ · · ·
– LW(m
♭1
i1) = w
♭1
i1 ≻ · · · , LD(m
♭1
i1) = d
♭1
i1 ≻ · · ·
LW(m
♭2
i1) = w
♭2
i1 ≻ · · · , LD(m
♭2
i1) = d
♭2
i1 ≻ · · ·
– LM(w
♭1
i1 ) = mi1 ≻ m
♭1
i1 ≻ · · · , LD(w
♭1
i1 ) = d
♭1
i1 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ · · ·
LM(w
♭2
i1 ) = mi1 ≻ m
♭2
i1 ≻ · · · , LD(w
♭2
i1 ) = d
♭2
i1 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ · · ·
– LM(d
♭1
i1) = mi1 ≻ m
♭1
i1 ≻ · · · , LW(d
♭1
i1) = w
♭1
i1 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ · · ·
LM(d
♭2
i1) = mi1 ≻ m
♭2
i1 ≻ · · · , LW(d
♭2
i1) = w
♭2
i1 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ · · ·
The following case analysis proves that, in a stable matching M ′, mi1 will get only
players from the set {wgi1, w
g
i2, wia, d
g
i1, d
g
i2, dia}.
– Suppose thatmi1 gets two players ranking below w♭1i1 and d♭1i1 respectively. It can be
observed that for both w♭1i1 , d♭1i1 , the best man is mi1. Therefore, they would prefer
mi1 and so does he them, inducing a blocking triple to M ′, a contradiction.
– Suppose that mi1 gets a woman w ∈ {wia, wgi1, w
g
i2} and a dog d ranking below
d♭1i1 . In this case, we can be sure that d cannot be d
#
1 or d
#
2 or d
#
3 , since their
preferences guarantee that they will only be matched to other dummy players. So,
rmi1(w)+rmi1(d) ≥ 10, while rmi1(w♭1i1 )+rmi1(d♭1i1) = 9, causing (mi1, w♭1i1 , d♭1i1)
to become a blocking triple. This example explains why we need to “pad” the sim-
ple lists of mi1 with dummy players.
The case thatmi1 gets a dog d ∈ {dia, dgi1, d
g
i2} and a womanw ranking lower than
w♭2i1 follows analogus arguments; (mi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i2) will become a blocking triple.
– Suppose that mi1 gets only one of the players from the set {w♭1i1 , w♭2i1 , d♭1i1 , d♭2i1}.
Without loss of generality, we assume that (mi1, w♭1i1 , dφ), where dφ 6= d♭1i1 , is
part of the matching. For woman w♭1i1 , dog dφ cannot be the dummy player d
#
1 .
Therefore, rw♭1i1 (mi1) + rw♭1i1 (d
φ) ≥ 4 > 3 = rw♭1i1
(m♭1i1) + rw♭1i1
(d♭1i1). Similarly
for d♭1i1 , rd♭1i1 (m
♭1
i1) + rd♭1i1 (w
♭1
i1 ) = 3, which is better than whatever combination
it can get. Therefore, we have that (m♭1i1 , w♭1i1 , d♭1i1) constitutes a blocking triple to
M ′. This example shows why we need to pad the preference of w♭1i1 , d♭1i1 (and also
w♭2i1 , d
♭2
i1) with dummy players.
– Suppose that mi1 gets w♭1i1 and d♭1i1 . Note that w♭1i1 ≻ w♭2i1 and d♭2i1 ≻ d♭1i1 . There-
fore, mi1 is indifferent to the combinations of w♭2i1 and d♭2i1 , since rmi1(w♭1i1 ) +
rmi1(d
♭1
i1) = 9 = rmi1(w
♭2
i1 ) + rmi1(d
♭2
i1). Additionally, w♭2i1 , d♭2i1 strictly prefer
mi1. Hence (mi1, w♭2i1 , d♭2i1) constitutes a blocking triple of degree 2 to M ′. This
explains why we need two sets of guard players to guarantee that the doppleganger
will “behave” in a stable matching.
Again, the case that mi1 gets w♭2i1 and d♭2i1 follows analogus arguments.
The other two dopplegangers mi2,mi3 also have six associated guard players for
each; they, along with their associated guard players, have similar preferences to guar-
antee that mi2 and mi3 will only get garbage collectors or the woman-dog pairs with
whom mi shares triples. The only difference in the lists is that mi2 and mi3 replace
wia, dia with wib, dib, and with wic, dic, respectively, in their simple lists. For a sum-
mary of the simple lists of members in the set X , see Table 1. It should be noted
that wgi1, d
g
i1 (and also wgi2, dgi2) rank the three dopplegangers in reverse order. This
trick guarantees that the dopplegangers will not form blocking triples with the garbage
collectors, defeating our purpose. For example, suppose (mi1, wia, dia) is part of the
matching, we want to avoid (mi1, wgi1, d
g
i1) to becoming a blocking triple. It can be
easily verified that if wgi1 and d
g
i1 are matched to mi2 or mi3, such a blocking triple will
not be formed.
Table 1. The simple lists of all players in the set X = M1∪M2∪M3∪Wg1 ∪W
g
2 ∪W∪D
g
1 ∪
Dg2 ∪D. We assume that there exist three triples (mi, wia, dia), (mi, wib, dib), (mi, wic, dic) in
T .
Player Simple Lists
mi1 ∈M1 LW(mi1)=w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wia ≻ w
♭1
i1 ≻ w
♭2
i1 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ w
#
2 ≻ w
#
3 ≻ · · ·
LD(mi1) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dia ≻ d
♭2
i1 ≻ d
♭1
i1 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ d
#
2 ≻ d
#
3 ≻ · · ·
mi2 ∈M1 LW(mi2)=w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wib ≻ w
♭1
i2 ≻ w
♭2
i2 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ w
#
2 ≻ w
#
3 ≻ · · ·
LD(mi2) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dib ≻ d
♭2
i2 ≻ d
♭1
i2 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ d
#
2 ≻ d
#
3 ≻ · · ·
mi3 ∈M1 LW(mi3)=w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wic ≻ w
♭1
i3 ≻ w
♭2
i3 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ w
#
2 ≻ w
#
3 ≻ · · ·
LD(mi3) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dic ≻ d
♭2
i3 ≻ d
♭1
i3 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ d
#
2 ≻ d
#
3 ≻ · · ·
w
g
i1 ∈ W
g
1 LM(w
g
i1) = mi1 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi3 ≻ · · ·
LD(w
g
i1) = d
g
i1 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ d
#
2 ≻ d
#
3 ≻ · · ·
d
g
i1 ∈ D
g
1 LM(d
g
i1) = mi3 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi1 ≻ · · ·
LW(d
g
i1) = w
g
i1 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ w
#
2 ≻ w
#
3 ≻ · · ·
w
g
i2 ∈ W
g
2 LM(w
g
i2) = mi1 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi3 ≻ · · ·
LD(w
g
i2) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
#
1 ≻ d
#
2 ≻ d
#
3 ≻ · · ·
d
g
i2 ∈ D
g
2 LM(d
g
i2) = mi3 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi1 ≻ · · ·
LW(d
g
i2) = w
g
i2 ≻ w
#
1 ≻ w
#
2 ≻ w
#
3 ≻ · · ·
w ∈ W LM(w) = · · ·
LD(w) = · · ·
d ∈ D LM(d) = · · ·
LW(d) = · · ·
Finally, garbage collectors also use dummy players to pad their simple lists, to
avoid the awkward situation that some doppleganger is matched to a real woman and a
garbage collector dog (or a real dog and a garbage collector woman). How this arrange-
ment works will be clear in the proof below.
Lemma 3. Suppose a stable matching M ′ exists in the derived stable family problem
instance Υ ′. The following facts hold in M ′:
– Fact A: The three sets of dummy players are matched to one another.
– Fact B: For each doppleganger mij ∈ M1 ∪M2 ∪M3, the ranks of his family
members are at least as high as 3 in his simple lists.
– Fact C: The six associated guard players of each dopplegangermij ∈M1∪M2∪
M3 are matched to one another.
Proof. Fact A follows directly from construction. Fact B is true as we have argued in
the case analysis before. Fact C is true because if the guard players are not matched to
one another, they will block M ′, unless w♭1ij , d♭1ij or w♭2ij , d♭2ij are matched to mij in M ′,
but this is impossible because of Fact B. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Suppose a stable matching M ′ exists in the derived stable family problem
instance Υ ′. Consider the garbage collectors wgi1, d
g
i1, w
g
i2, d
g
i2 created for man mi ∈
M. We must have that wgi1, d
g
i1 belong to the same triple t1 and that w
g
i2, d
g
i2 belong
to the same triple t2 in M ′. Moreover, in t1 and t2, the man player must be one of the
dopplegangers mi1,mi2 and mi3.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by progressively establishing the following facts.
Fact D: wgi2 and d
g
i2 must belong to the same triple t2 in M .
Proof: For a contradiction, suppose that wgi2 and d
g
i2 are in different triples in M ′.
We claim that (mi1, wgi2, d
g
i2) forms a blocking triple. It is obvious that mi1 and w
g
i2
prefer such a triple. Now let the man and woman partners of dgi2 be mφ and wφ 6= w
g
i2;
then by Fact A in Lemma 3, rdgi2(w) ≥ 5. We have that rdgi2(mi1) + rdgi2(w
g
i2) = 4 <
6 ≤ rdgi2(m
φ) + rdgi2(w
φ). So dgi2 will also prefer mi1 and w
g
i2, forming a blocking
triple with them to M ′. This proof also shows why we need to pad the preferences of
the garbage collectors.
Fact E: wgi1 and d
g
i1 must belong to the same triple t1 in M ′.
Proof: For a contradiction, suppose that (mφ1, wgi1, dφ1) and (mφ2, wφ2, d
g
i1) are
triples in M ′. There exists at least one doppleganger in {mi1,mi2,mi3} preferring the
combination of wgi1 and d
g
i1 (since at most one doppleganger can be matched to wgi2
and dgi2.) Let such a doppleganger be mij . Then by Fact A in Lemma 3, rwgi1(mij) +
rwgi1(d
g
i1) ≤ 4 < 6 ≤ rwgi1(m
φ1) + rwgi1(d
φ2); and similarly, rdgi1(mij) + rdgi1(w
g
i1) ≤
4 < 6 ≤ rdgi1(m
φ2) + rdgi1(w
φ2), implying that (mij , wgi1, d
g
i1) blocks M .
Fact F: wgi2 and d
g
i2 must be matched to one of the dopplegangers in M , and so are
wgi1 and d
g
i1.
Proof: If wgi2 and d
g
i2 are not matched to a doppleganger of mi, then any dopple-
ganger mij will prefer the combination of them over his family members, causing
(mij , w
g
i2, d
g
i2) to block M . A similar argument applies to the case of w
g
i1 and d
g
i1,
giving the lemma. ⊓⊔
By the previous two lemmas, we have established the correctness of the reduction
on one side.
Lemma 5. (Sufficiency) If there exists a stable matching M ′ in the derived stable
family problem instance Υ ′, there exists a perfect matching M in the original three-
dimensional matching instance Υ .
To show the necessity, we need to prove one more lemma.
Lemma 6. In a matching M ′ in the derived stable family problem instance Υ ′, sup-
pose that dummy players are matched to one another. Suppose further that the garbage
collectors of mi are matched to two of the dopplegangers, while the remaining dopple-
ganger mij is matched to a real woman and a real dog with whom mi shares a triple
in T in the original three-dimensional matching instance Υ . Then there is no blocking
triple in which the dopplegangers mi1,mi2, and mi3 are involved.
Proof. We assume that (mi1, wgi2, dgi2), (mi2, wgi1, dgi1), (mi3, wic, dic) ∈ M ′. Other
cases follow analogous arguments. We claim that there does not exist a blocking triple of
the form (mij , wgi1, dφ1), (mij , w
g
i2, d
φ2), (mij , w
φ3, dgi1), and (mij , wφ4, d
g
i2) where
dφ1 6= dgi1, d
φ2 6= dgi2, w
φ3 6= wgi1, and wφ4 6= w
g
i2. We only argue the first case. Since
dφ1 6∈ {d#1 , d
#
2 , d
#
3 }, we have rwgi1(d
φ1) ≥ 5 > 3 = rwgi1(d
g
i1) + rwgi1(mi2). There-
fore, wgi1 has no incentive to join the combination of mij and dφ1. So we only need to
consider the three following potential blocking triples: (mi2, wgi2, d
g
i2),
(mi3, w
g
i2, d
g
i2), (mi3, w
g
i1, d
g
i1). It can be easily verified that they do not block M ′ be-
cause the orders of the three dopplegangers in the simple lists of wgi1 and d
g
i1 (and also
wgi2 and d
g
i2) are reversed. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. (Necessity) Suppose that there is a perfect matchingM in the original three-
dimensional matching instance Υ . There also exists a stable matchingM ′ in the derived
stable family problem instance Υ ′.
Proof. We build a stable matching M ′ in Υ ′ as follows. Let the dummy players
{m#j , w
#
j , d
#
j }, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, be matched to one another. Given any doppleganger mij ,
let his guard players {m♭1ij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij }, {m♭2ij , w♭2ij , d♭2ij } be matched to one another as
well. Furthermore, suppose that (mi, wix, dix) ∈ M . Let the doppleganger who lists
wix and dix above his guard players be matched to wix and dix, while the other two
dopplegangers be matched to the garbage collectors. By this construction, it can be seen
that none of the guard players and dummy players will be part of a blocking triple. This,
combined with Lemma 6, completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Suppose that in the given three-dimensional matching instance Υ , |M| = |W| =
|D| = n. Then in the derived instance Υ ′, we use in all 3n dopplegangers, 18n guard
players, 4n garbage collectors, 2n real women and real dogs, and 9 dummy players.
Their preferences (in the form of simple lists) can be generated in O(n2) time. There-
fore, this is a polynomial-time reduction. Also, given any matching, we definitely can
check its stability inO(n3) time. Combining the two facts with Lemma 5 and Lemma 7,
we can conclude:
Theorem 1. It is NP-complete to decide whether strong stable matchings exist under
the PON scheme. Therefore, the question of deciding existence of strong stable matching
is also NP-complete when the full preference lists are consistent, i.e., when they are
relaxed linear extensions of preference posets.
Super Stability and Ultra Stability It can be observed that throughout the proof, all
arguments involving blocking triples use those of degree 3. The only exception is the
occasion that we argue that a doppleganger cannot be matched to his guard players in
a stable matching. To recall, supposing that (mij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij ) is part of a matching, then
(mij , w
♭2
ij , d
♭2
ij ) is a blocking triple of degree 2. (Or if the latter is part of the match-
ing, the former is a blocking triple of degree 2). Therefore, our reduction only uses
blocking triples of degree 2 or 3; both are still blocking triples with regard to super
stability and ultra stability. Moreover, when we argue the strong-stability of matchings
in the reduction, we never allow blocking triples of degree 0 or degree 1 to exist. There-
fore, essentially, our reduction has also established the NP-completeness of super stable
matchings and ultra stable matchings.
4 Threesome Roommates with Relaxed Linear Extensions of
Preference Posets
In this section, we exhibit a reduction of stable family to threesome roommates, thereby
establishing the NP-completeness of strong/super/ultra stable matchings in the latter
problem. Instead of the PON scheme, we use the more general scheme in which any
relaxed linear extension of preference posets is allowed. We choose to use this scheme
because the involved reduction technique has a different flavor. Nonetheless, we do have
another reduction for the PON scheme, whose idea is sketched in the appendix.
Let an instance of stable family problem be Υ = (M,W ,D, Ψ), where Ψ represents
the preferences of the players in M ∪ W ∪ D. We create an instance of threesome
roommates Υ ′ = (R′, Ψ ′) by copying all players in M∪W ∪ D into R′. Regarding
the preferences in Ψ ′, we first build up the simple lists of all players.
– Suppose m ∈ M, L(m) = LW(m) ≻ LD(m) ≻ pi(M−{m}).
– Suppose w ∈ W , L(w) = LD(w) ≻ LM(w) ≻ pi(W − {w}).
– Suppose d ∈ D, L(d) = LM(d) ≻ LW(d) ≻ pi(D − {d}).
In words, a man lists all women and then all dogs, based respectively on their origi-
nal order in his simple lists in Ψ . He then attaches other fellow men in arbitrary order to
the end of his list. Women and dogs have analogous arrangements in their simple lists.
Having constructed the simple lists, we still need to build consistent relaxed linear
extensions. By Lemma 2, we can construct them as follows:
– Consider m ∈ M and assume that W = LW(m), D = LD(m), N = pi(M−
{m}). His relaxed linear extension is: Eπ(W × W ) ≻ X ≻ Eπ(W × N) ≻
Eπ(D×D) ≻ Eπ(D×N) ≻ Eπ(N ×N), where X is the original relaxed linear
extension of man m’s preference poset given in Ψ .
– Consider w ∈ W and assume that D = LD(w), N = LM(w),W = pi(W−{w}).
Her relaxed linear extension is: Eπ(D×D) ≻ Y ≻ Eπ(D×W ) ≻ Eπ(N×N) ≻
Eπ(N ×W ) ≻ Eπ(W ×W ), where Y is the original relaxed linear extension of
woman w’s preference poset given in Ψ .
– Consider d ∈ D and assume that N = LM(d),W = LW(d), D = pi(D−{d}). Its
relaxed linear extension is: Eπ(N × N) ≻ Z ≻ Eπ(N ×D) ≻ Eπ(W ×W ) ≻
Eπ(W × D) ≻ Eπ(D × D), where Z is the original relaxed linear extension of
dog d’s preference poset given in Ψ .
To prove that the reduction Υ to Υ ′ is valid, we will rely heavily on the following
technical lemma.
Lemma 8. In the derived instance Υ ′, if a stable matching M ′ exists, every triple in
M ′ must contain a man, a woman, and a dog. Moreover, suppose that in a matching
M ′′ in Υ ′ in which each player gets two other types of players as roommates, then a
blocking triple cannot contain two (or three) players of the same type.
Proof. For the first part, we argue case by case.
1. If {m,wi, wj} ∈ M ′, there exists another man m′ who can get neither a woman-
woman combination nor a woman-dog combination. By construction, m′ would
prefer any woman-dog combination to his assigned roommates in M ′. Similarly,
there exists a dog d′ who gets another fellow dog in M ′. Such a dog would pre-
fer a man-woman combination to its assigned roommates in M ′. Finally, woman
wi and wj would prefer dog-man combination. Therefore, both {m′, wi, d′} and
{m′, wj , d
′} block M ′, a contradiction.
2. If {m,mi,mj} ∈ M ′, then there exists a woman w who gets a fellow woman in
M ′ and a dog d who gets a fellow dog in M ′. Thus, woman w would prefer a dog-
man combination and dog d would prefer a man-woman combination. Therefore,
{m,w, d}, {mi, w, d}, {mj , w, d} block M ′, a contradiction.
3. All other cases can be argued similarly.
For the second part, suppose that matching M ′′ has the stated property. Given any
manm, by our construction, if there is a blocking triple containingm and in which there
are two players of the same type, the only possibility of a blocking triple is {m,wi, wj}.
However, neither wi nor wj would prefer such a triple, because in our construction, for
a woman, a dog-man combination is better than a man-woman combination. The other
potential blocking triples not involving men follow analogous arguments, thus giving
us the lemma. ⊓⊔
It is straightforward to use Lemma 8 to prove our reduction is a valid one.
Theorem 2. Deciding whether strong/super/ultra stable matchings exist in the three-
some roommates problem is NP-complete when full preference lists are consistent, i.e.,
when they are relaxed linear extension of preference posets.
5 Weak Stability of Threesome Roommates with Strictly-ordered
Consistent Preference Lists
In this section, we investigate the complexity of the threesome roommates problem un-
der the SOCL scheme, with the proviso that full preference lists must be strict linear
extensions of preference posets. We prove that under this scheme, both the the stable
family problem and the threesome roommates problem are NP-complete, thereby an-
swering the open question posed by the anonymous reviewers of Ng and Hirschberg. We
could have shown the stable family problem is NP-complete and used this fact and the
reduction given in the previous section to show threesome roommates is NP-complete.
However, our reduction for the former problem needs to rely on a rather complicated
gadget. On the other hand, using a similar idea, the latter problem has a simpler gad-
get, thus we present a direct reduction for the latter. For the former problem, a formal
NP-completeness proof can be found in the appendix.
The basic idea is similar to the one we used in Section 3. Suppose that the given
three-dimensional matching instance is Υ = (M,W ,D, T ), where T ⊆ M×W×D,
moreover, every element in M∪W∪D appears 2 or 3 times in T . We will transform it
into a threesome roommates instance Υ ′ = (R′, Ψ ′). We also pre-process the instance
Υ so that every man in M appears in exactly three triples of T .
Every man mi will have three dopplegangers mi1,mi2,mi3, two women wgi1, w
g
i2
and two dogs dgi1, d
g
i2 as garbage collectors. Supposing that (mi, wix, dix) is one of the
triples given in T , a dopplegangermij in his simple list rankswgi2, d
g
i2, w
g
i1, d
g
i1, wix, dix
the highest, followed by his associated guard players. The key difference is how to
design the guard players’ preferences so that mij will not get any players ranking below
them (or among them) in a stable matching.
We introduce the following gadget. Let Υ †ij be a roommate instance of only 4 stu-
dents, m♭3ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij , and m♭6ij , such that no stable matchings exists in Υ
†
ij . An example
of such an instance can be found in Table 3 in the appendix.
Given such an instance Υ †ij , if m♭3ij is “removed” from Υ
†
ij , we surely have a stable
matching, {{m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }}. On the other hand, if m♭3ij “exists,” then any matching
of Υ †ij will have at least one blocking triple. Our plan is to embed the instance Υ
†
ij into
the derived instance Υ ′ so that if m♭3ij is not removed, then a blocking triple involving
three members from the set {m♭3ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } arises.
We now explain more precisely what we mean by removing m♭3ij and embedding
Υ †ij into Υ ′. First, we need two more guard players m♭1ij and m♭2ij to make sure that mij
will get two players from the set {wg2ij , w
g1
ij , wix, d
g2
ij , d
g1
ij , dix}. This can be achived
by the simple lists and proper choices of pivots. Recall that a pivot is an element that
dominates all its incomparable elements in the constructed linear extension.
– L(mij) = w
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ wix ≻ dix ≻ m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭2
ij ≻ · · ·
(pivot: {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij })
– L(m♭1ij ) = mij ≻ m
♭2
ij ≻ m
♭3
ij ≻ · · ·
(pivot: {m♭2ij ,m♭3ij })
– L(m♭2ij ) = mij ≻ m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭3
ij ≻ · · ·
(pivot: {m♭1ij ,m♭3ij })
– L(m♭3ij ) = m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭2
ij ≻ X3 ≻ · · · , where X3 is the original simple list of m♭3ij in
the instance Υ †ij . The linear extension of poset L(m♭3ij )× L(m♭3ij ) is {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } ≻
Eπ((m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭2
ij )×X3) ≻ Eπ((m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭2
ij )× (L(m
♭3
ij )−{X3∪m
♭1
ij ∪m
♭2
ij })) ≻
Eπ(X3 × X3) ≻ Eπ(X3 × (L(m
♭3
ij ) − {X3 ∪m
♭1
ij ∪m
♭2
ij })) ≻ Eπ((L(m
♭3
ij ) −
{X3 ∪ m
♭1
ij ∪ m
♭2
ij }) × (L(m
♭3
ij ) − {X3 ∪ m
♭1
ij ∪ m
♭2
ij })). (Such an extension is
allowed because of Lemma 2.)
– L(m♭4ij ) = X4 ≻ · · · , L(m
♭5
ij ) = X5 ≻ · · · , L(m
♭6
ij ) = X6 ≻ · · · , where
X4, X5, X6 are the original simple lists of m♭4ij , m♭5ij , and m♭6ij in Υ
†
ij , respectively.
The linear extension of L(m♭4ij )×L(m♭4ij ) isEπ(X4×X4) ≻ · · · ; similarly, the lin-
ear extension of L(m♭5ij )×L(m♭5ij ) and L(m♭6ij )×L(m♭6ij ) are Eπ(X5×X5) ≻ · · ·
and Eπ(X6 × X6) ≻ · · · , respectively. (Such extensions are allowed because of
Lemma 2.)
Ideally, in a stable matching of Υ ′, mij will be matched to two players ranking
higher than m♭1ij , and {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } and {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } will be part of the match-
ing. Then,m♭3ij in this sense is “removed” from Υ
†
ij ; because {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } are his favorite
roommates, he has no incentive to leave them to go for members in {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }.
On the other hand, if m♭3ij cannot get {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } in a matching, then m♭3ij will be
matched to members from the set {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } and/or some other students rank-
ing below them, disrupting the stability of the embedded instance Υ †ij , and hence also
Υ ′. This intuition is captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 9. In a matchingM ′ in Υ ′, if the guard playerm♭3ij is not matched to {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij },
a blocking triple containing three members from the set {mij ,m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }
blocks M ′. Conversely, if {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij }, {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } ∈ M , then there is no
blocking triple involving any of the six guard players of mij .
Proof. We first consider the case m♭3ij gets one of {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } in M ′. Without loss of
generality, suppose {m♭1ij ,m♭3ij ,mφ} ∈ M ′. There are two subcases. (1) If mφ = mij ,
then {mij ,m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } blocks M ′; (2) if mφ 6= mij , then {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } blocks M ′.
So we have three more cases. (1) m♭3ij is matched to a student from the set {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }
and another student not from the set {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }. (2) m♭3ij is matched
two students neither of whom is in the set {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }. (3)m♭3ij is matched
to two students from the set {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }.
– In the first case, by our construction, all four persons {m♭3ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } prefer
all the combinations of one another to their assigned roommate. So, any three of
them will constitute a blocking triple to M ′.
– In the second case and the third case, three students from the {m♭3ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }
are matched to one another. The situation is identical to that we have a matching
M ′ij in the instance Υij (in which the fourth person is left unmatched). Since Υij
does not allow stable matching, a blocking triple must exist to block M ′ij . By our
construction, such a blocking triple blocks M ′ as well. This completes the first part
of the lemma.
The second part of the lemma follows from the fact that {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } dominates all
other elements in m♭3ij ’s preference poset L(m♭3ij )×L(m♭3ij ), hence m♭3ij will not form a
blocking triple with anyone else. Finally, since m♭3ij will not be part of a blocking triple,
the three guard players m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij find one another ranks the highest in their simple
lists (hence also in their full preference lists). They will not form a blocking triple with
one another, nor with other players. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Now we will explain how the guard players guarantee that a doppleganger mij will
only get players ranking higher than them in a stable matching in Υ ′.
Lemma 10. In a stable matching M ′ of Υ ′, mij must have two players as room-
mates ranking higher than m♭1ij in his simple list L(mij). Moreover, the two triples
{m♭1ij ,m
♭2
ij ,m
♭3
ij } and {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } must be part of the stable matching M ′.
Proof. The following case analysis shows that mij must get two roommates ranking
higher than m♭1ij .
– Ifmij gets {mφ1,mφ2} and (at least) one of them ranks lower than m♭2ij , then either
{m♭1ij ,m
♭2
ij }||L(mij)×L(mij){m
φ1,mφ2}, or {m♭1ij ,m
♭2
ij } ≻L(mij)×L(mij) {m
φ1,mφ2}.
For both cases, since {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } is the pivot in the linear extension of L(mij) ×
L(mij), mij will prefer the combination {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij }. Similarly, for m♭1ij and m♭2ij ,
the combination of mij and the other ranks the highest in the linear extension of
their preference posets. Therefore, {mij ,m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } blocks M ′.
– Suppose that mij gets only one of m♭1ij and m♭2ij as roommate in M ′. We argue
separately.
• Suppose that {mij ,m♭1ij ,m♭3ij } ∈M ′ or {mij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } ∈M ′, then
{mij ,m
♭1
ij ,m
♭2
ij } blocks M ′, a contradiction.
• Suppose {mij ,m♭1ij ,m
φ
ij} ∈ M
′ or {mij ,m
♭2
ij ,m
φ
ij} ∈ M
′
, where mφij 6=
m♭3ij , then because {m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } and {m♭1ij ,m♭3ij } are the pivots in L(m♭1ij ) ×
L(m♭1ij ) and in L(m♭2ij )× L(m♭2ij ) respectively, {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } blocks M ′, a
contradiction.
– Suppose {mij ,m♭1ij ,m♭2ij } ∈ M ′, then by Lemma 9, a blocking triple containing
three students from {m♭3ij ,m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij } blocks M ′, again a contradiction.
By the above discussion, in M ′, mij must get both roommates ranking higher than
m♭1ij . Finally, if {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } 6∈M ′, they form a blocking triple; similarly, if
{m♭4ij ,m
♭5
ij ,m
♭6
ij } 6∈M
′
, they block M ′. So we have the lemma. ⊓⊔
We summarize the preferences in Table 2. Note that this time the garbage collectors
also need their own guard players. Let p ∈ Wg1 ∪ W
g
2 ∪ D
g
1 ∪ D
g
2 , then her/its three
guard players p♭1, p♭2, p♭3 have the simple lists as follows:
– L(p♭1) = p ≻ p♭2 ≻ p♭3 ≻ · · · (pivot: {p♭2, p♭3})
– L(p♭2) = p ≻ p♭1 ≻ p♭3 ≻ · · · (pivot: {p♭1, p♭3})
– L(p♭3) = p♭1 ≻ p♭2 ≻ · · ·
Table 2. The preference lists of all players in the set X = M1∪M2∪M3∪Wg1∪W
g
2∪W∪D
g
1∪
Dg2 ∪D. We assume that there exist three triples (mi, wia, dia), (mi, wib, dib), (mi, wic, dic) in
T . Moreover, for any real woman w ∈ W and real dog d ∈ D, let B be the part of the simple list
explicitly spelt out in the table (excluding the “· · · ” part), the linear extension of her/its preference
poset is Eπ(B ×B) ≻ · · ·
Player Simple Lists Pivot
mi1 ∈ M1 L(mi1)=w
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ wia ≻ dia ≻ m
♭1
i1 ≻ m
♭2
i1 ≻ · · · {m
♭1
i1 ,m
♭2
i1}
mi2 ∈ M1 L(mi2)=w
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ wib ≻ dib ≻ m
♭1
i2 ≻ m
♭2
i2 ≻ · · · {m
♭1
i2 ,m
♭2
i2}
mi3 ∈ M1 L(mi3)=w
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ wic ≻ dic ≻ m
♭1
i3 ≻ m
♭2
i3 ≻ · · · {m
♭1
i3 ,m
♭2
i3}
w
g
i1 ∈ W
g
1 L(w
g
i1) = d
g
i1 ≻ mi3 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi1 ≻ w
g,♭1
i1 ≻ w
g,♭2
i1 ≻ · · · {w
g,♭1
i1 , w
g,♭2
i1 }
w
g
i2 ∈ W
g
2 L(w
g
i2) = d
g
i2 ≻ mi3 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi1 ≻ w
g,♭1
i2 ≻ w
g,♭2
i2 ≻ · · · {w
g,♭1
i2 , w
g,♭2
i2 }
d
g
i1 ∈ D
g
1 L(d
g
i1) = w
g
i1 ≻ mi1 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi3 ≻ d
g,♭1
i1 ≻ d
g,♭2
i1 ≻ · · · {d
g,♭1
i1 , d
g,♭2
i1 }
d
g
i2 ∈ D
g
2 L(d
g
i2) = w
g
i2 ≻ mi1 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi3 ≻ d
g,♭1
i2 ≻ d
g,♭2
i2 ≻ · · · {d
g,♭1
i2 , d
g,♭2
i2 }
w ∈ W L(w) = pi({d|(∗, w, d) ∈ T }) ≻ pi({mij |(mi, w, ∗) ∈ T , w ≻mij m
♭1
ij}) ≻≻ · · ·
d ∈ D L(d) = pi({mij |(mi, ∗, d) ∈ T , d ≻mij m
♭1
ij }) ≻ pi({w|(∗, w, d) ∈ T }) ≻ · · ·
Lemma 11. Suppose a stable matching M ′ exists in the derived threesome roommates
instance Υ ′. Consider the garbage collectors wgi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i1, d
g
i2 created for man mi ∈
M. Woman wgi1 and dog d
g
i1 must belong to the same triple t1 ∈ M ′ and woman w
g
i2
and dog dgi2 must belong to the same triple t2 ∈ M ′. Moreover, in t1 and t2, the third
roommate must be one of the dopplegangers mi1,mi2, and mi3.
Proof. We prove this by establishing the following facts.
Fact G: The garbage collectors wgi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i1, d
g
i2 never get two men as roommates
in the stable matching M ′.
Proof: We argue the case of wgi1 with two men as roommates; the remaining cases
follow analogous arguments. By Lemma 10, the possible roommates of wgi1 can only
be from the set {dgi1, d
g
i2,mi1,mi2,
mi3}. Suppose {wgi1,mij ,mij′} ∈ M ′. Then mij has a roommate ranking lower than
m♭1ij , contradicting Lemma 10.
Fact H: wgi1 and d
g
i2 cannot belong to a triple in M ′; similarly, w
g
i2 and d
g
i1 cannot
belong to a triple inM ′. Moreover, none of the garbage collectors can get a real woman
w ∈ W and a real dog d ∈ D in M ′
Proof: For a contradiction, suppose that wgi1 and d
g
i2 belong to the same triple. We
claim that {wgi1, w
g,♭1
i1 , w
g,♭2
i1 } blocks M ′, because of the fact that {w
g,♭1
i1 , w
g,♭2
i1 } is the
pivot in wgi1’s preference poset. The other cases follows analogous argument.
By Fact G and Fact H, we only need to consider the remaining possibility that in the
triple t2 = {wgi2, d
g
i2, p}, where the third roommate p 6∈ {mi1,mi2,mi3}. In this case,
{wgi2, d
g
2,mi1} blocks M ′. The third roommate in the triple t1 can be argued similarly,
and so we have the lemma. ⊓⊔
By the Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, we establish
Lemma 12. (Sufficiency) If there exists a stable matching M ′ in the derived three-
some roommates instance Υ ′, there exists a perfect matching M in the original three-
dimensional matching instance Υ .
We need another lemma to show the necessity.
Lemma 13. In a matching M ′ in the derived threesome roommates problem Υ ′, sup-
pose that the garbage collectors of mi are matched to two of the dopplegangers of
mi, while the remaining doppleganger mij is matched to a real woman and a real
dog with whom mi shares a triple in T in the original three-dimensional matching
instance Υ . Then there is no blocking triple involving any player in the set X =
M1 ∪M2 ∪M3 ∪W
g
1 ∪W
g
2 ∪W ∪D
g
1 ∪D
g
2 ∪ D.
Proof. We assume that {{mi1, wgi2, dgi2}, {mi2, wgi1, dgi1}, {mi3, wic, dic}} ⊂M . Other
cases follow analogous arguments.
Fact I: There does not exist a blocking triple of the form: {mij , wgi1, pφ1}, {mij , wgi2, pφ2},
{mij , d
g
i1, p
φ3} and {mij , dgi2, pφ4}, where pφ1 6= d
g
i1, p
φ2 6= dgi2, p
φ3 6= wgi1, and
pφ4 6= wgi2.
Proof: We only discuss the first case. By construction, supposemij prefers {wgi1, pφ1},
then pφ1 must be in the set of {wgi2, d
g
i1, d
g
i2}. In any of the cases, pφ1 prefers his as-
signed roommates to the combination of {mij , wgi1}. This can be observed from the fact
that wgi1 always ranks below pφ1,♭2 (pφ1’s guard player). So, {mij , wgi1, pφ1} cannot be
a blocking triple.
Fact J: The following triples cannot block M ′: {mi2, wgi2, dgi2}, {mi3, wgi2, dgi2},
{mi3, w
g
i1, d
g
i1}.
Proof: This can be observed from the fact that the orders of the three dopplegangers
in the simple lists of wgi1 and d
g
i1 (and also of wgi2, dgi2) are reversed.
Note that by Fact I and Fact J, we have ruled out the possibility that a blocking triple
involves the dopplegangers or the garbage collectors.
Fact K: There does not exist a blocking triple involving woman w ∈ W or a real
dog d ∈ D.
Proof: We only consider the first case. By construction, if woman w prefers some
other combination, it can be only two real dogs dφ5 and dφ6, or a real dog dφ7 and a
dopplegangermφ8. In the first case, dφ6 will not prefer the combination of {w, dφ5}, be-
cause of the way we construct the linear extension of its preference poset. So {w, dφ5, dφ6}
cannot be a blocking triple. In the second case, mφ8, being a doppleganger, by Fact I
and Fact J, he cannot be part of a blocking triple. So {mφ8, w, dφ7} cannot be a block-
ing triple.
Combining Fact I, J and K, we prove the lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 14. (Necessity) Suppose there is a perfect matching M in the original three-
dimensional matching instance Υ . Then there also exists a stable matching M ′ in the
derived threesome roommates instance Υ ′.
Proof. We build a stable matching M ′ in the derived threesome roommates instance Υ ′
based on M .
Suppose that (mi, wix, dix) ∈M . Let the doppleganger who listswix and dix above
his guard players to be matched to wix and dix, while the other two dopplegangers be
matched to the garbage collectors. Let the three guard players of the garbage collectors
be matched to one another as well. And finally, for the six guard players of a dopple-
ganger mij , let {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij } be matched to one another; also {m♭4ij ,m♭5ij ,m♭6ij }
should be matched to one another.
By this construction and Lemma 10, it can be seen that none of the guard players
will be part of blocking triples. This, combined with Lemma 13, completes the proof.
⊓⊔
Letting n = |M| = |W| = |D|, we use in all 3n dopplegangers, 4n garbage
collectors, 30n guard players, 2n real women and real dogs. Therefore, the reduction
can be done in polynomial time. Checking whether a matching is stable also can be
done in O(n3) time. This, combined with Lemma 12 and Lemma 14, gives us the proof
(the threesome roommates part) of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. It is NP-complete to decide whether weak stable matchings exist under
the SOCL scheme, for both the stable family and the threesome roommates problems.
Hence, it is also NP-complete to decide whether a weak stable matching exists when
consistent preferences are allowed to contain ties: i.e. the full preferences are relaxed
linear extensions of preference posets.
6 Conclusion and Related Problems
In this paper, we answer the open question of whether the stable family and the three-
some roommates problems are NP-complete if all players have to provide consistent
preference lists. We introduce a scheme in which players can express indifference on
the precondition that their preferences have to be consistent. Under this scheme, a vari-
ety of stabilities are defined and we prove that all lead to NP-complete problems.
Since we have proved that the general cases of stable family and threesome room-
mates are NP-complete, a natural question to ask is whether there are special cases that
allow polynomial time solutions. Actually, a variant of the stable family problem that
can be solved efficiently does exist.
Consider the following scheme. Every player submits two simple lists. A man eval-
uates combinations first by the woman he gets, then by the dog; a woman first by the
man she gets, then by the dog; a dog first by the man it gets, then by the woman. (Note
the asymmetry). It is not hard to see that we can apply the Gale-Shapley algorithm twice
to get a weak stable matching: letting the men propose to women and then propose to
dogs. Women and dogs make the decision of acceptance or rejection based on their
simple lists of men [2]. Merging the two matchings will give a stable matching in the
stable family problem.
However, even a little twist can make the above scheme hard to solve. Suppose a
man decides first based on the woman he gets and then the dog; a woman first based on
the dog she gets and then on the man; a dog decides first based on the man it gets then
on the woman. The Gale-Shapley algorithm no longer works [1].
Interestingly, the above scheme is reminiscent of another open problem allegedly
originated by Knuth. Suppose that a man has only a simple list for women; a woman
has only a simple list for dogs; a dog has only a simple list for men. This problem
is called circular stable matching. Its complexity is still unknown. Some interesting
observations on this problem can be found in [1, 3].
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A Proofs of Lemmas in Section 2
Lemma 1 Given any poset Q and any element q ∈ Q. there exists a linear extension l
of Q such that if q||Qq′, then q ≻l q′.
Proof. We construct a graph whose nodes represent elements of Q and directed edges
(qi, qj) exist if qj ≻Q qi. We now add directed edges from all q’s incomparable el-
ements to q. We claim the graph is still acyclic. Suppose not. Then a directed cycle
including q must have been created in the process. But this implies that originally, there
is a path from q to one of its incomparable elements, which is impossible.
Since the new graph is still acyclic, by the well-known fact that an acyclic graph
allows a linear extension, we prove the lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2 Let l be a strictly-ordered list. Suppose l is decomposed into nonempty
contiguous sublists (l1, l2, · · · , lk) such that (1)
⋃k
i=1 li = l, (2) if e ≻li f , then e ≻l f ,
and (3) if e ∈ li, f ∈ lj , i < j, then e ≻l f . Then there exists a linear extension of l× l
such that all combinations drawn from {li, lj} precede all pairs drawn from {li′ , lj′},
provided that i ≤ j, i′ ≤ j′ and one of the following conditions holds (1) i < i′, (2)
i = i′, j < j′.
Proof. Given any two (not necessarily different) sublists li and lj , we can build a di-
rected graph Gij = (Vij , Eij) in which every vertex v ∈ Vij corresponds to a combi-
nation drawn from lists li and lj . Directed edges in Eij represent the precedence order
in the poset li × lj , which is a sub-poset of l × l. Since Gij is acylic, we have a linear
extension lGij of the elements in Gij
We now use the extensions lGij to construct the full extension of l × l. We string
out all graphs Gij horizontally such that the (k2 + k)/2 graphs are ordered in the
same way as defined in the lemma. To be precise, we list the graphs from left to
right as G11, G12, · · · , G1k, G22,G23, · · · ,G2k, · · · , G(k−1)(k−1),G(k−1)k, Gkk and
we can view these graphs Gij as if they were some “big” vertices in another graph G.
If in the poset l × l, there exists a combination drawn from lists {li, lj} preceding
another drawn from {li′ , lj′}, we add a directed edge into the graph G from vertex Gij
to vertex Gi′j′ .
It is not hard to see that all the newly-added edges go from “right to left” across
the (k2 + k)/2 big vertices. This implies that the graph G composed of the big vertices
Gij is acyclic, allowing a linear extension, which can be simply the way we list the big
vertices. Replacing each big vertex with the linear extension lGij gives the lemma. ⊓⊔
B Threesome Roommates under the PON scheme
We briefly explain the reduction idea under the PON scheme. Again we give a reduction
from a stable family instance Υ = (M,W ,D, Ψ) to a threesome roommates instance
Υ ′, assuming that the preferences given in Ψ are based on the PON scheme.
Supposing that |M| = n, we create 3n dummy players1 m#1 ,m
#
2 , · · · ,m
#
3n such
that every three of them must be matched to one another in a stable matching. To be
precise, given 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
– L(m#3i) = m
#
3i+1 ≻ m
#
3i+2 ≻ · · ·
– L(m#3i+1) = m
#
3i+2 ≻ m
#
3i ≻ · · ·
– L(m#3i+2) = m
#
3i ≻ m
#
3i+1 ≻ · · ·
For the players in M∪W ∪D, they need to use these dummy players to pad their
preferences:
– Consider m ∈ M and assume that W = LW(m), D = LD(m), N = pi(M−
{m}). His simple list in Ψ ′ is L(m) = W ≻ D ≻ pi({m#i |1 ≤ i ≤ 3n}) ≻ N .
– Consider w ∈ W and assume that D = LD(w), N = LM(w),W = pi(W−{w}).
Her simple list in Ψ ′ is L(w) = D ≻ N ≻ pi({m#i |1 ≤ i ≤ 3n}) ≻W .
– Consider d ∈ D and assume that N = LM(d),W = LW(d), D = pi(D − {d}).
Its simple list in Ψ ′ is L(d) = N ≻W ≻ pi({m#i |1 ≤ i ≤ 3n}) ≻ D.
The correctness arguments of the reduction are similar to those used in Lemma 8
and Theorem 2.
1 The number 3n is actually unnecessarily big, but we use it for ease of presentation
C An Example of a Threesome Roommates Instance of Size 4
without Stable Matchings
Table 3. An example of a threesome roommates instance of size 4 such that no stable matching
exists. Note in this case, there is only one possible linear extension of the preference poset.
Player Simple Lists
m♭3ij m
♭6
ij ≻ m
♭5
ij ≻ m
♭4
ij
m♭4ij m
♭3
ij ≻ m
♭6
ij ≻ m
♭5
ij
m♭5ij m
♭4
ij ≻ m
♭3
ij ≻ m
♭6
ij
m♭6ij m
♭5
ij ≻ m
♭4
ij ≻ m
♭3
ij
D Weak Stability of Stable Family with Strictly-ordered
Consistent Preference Lists under the SOCL scheme
To prove that the existence of weak stable matchings in stable family is NP-complete
under the SOCL scheme, we again resort to the reduction of three-dimensional match-
ing. The setting of the given instance Υ = (M,W ,D, T ) and the pre-processing step
are the same as we have done in Section 3 and Section 5. Every man mi appears
three times in triples in T ; and we create three dopplegangers mi1,mi2,mi3, and four
garbage collectors wgi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i1, d
g
i2. The basic idea is still to use a set of guard players
to restrict the possible family members of a doppleganger mij in a stable matching.
What complicates things is that we need to tailor a more involved gadget to suit our
purpose.
The gadget we need, like the one we used in Section 5, is a stable family instance
Υ †ij without stable matchings. Thankfully, such an instance is given to us in the paper of
Boros et al. [1] and is recreated in Table 4.
It can be checked that if m♭3ij is removed from Υ
†
ij , then there is a stable matching
M † = {(m♭1ij , w
♭1
ij , d
♭1
ij ), (m
♭2
ij , w
♭2
ij , d
♭2
ij )}. Our plan is to embed Υ
†
ij into the derived
stable family instance Υ ′ so that m♭3ij has to be absent from the embedded instance Υ
†
ij
in a stable matching of Υ ′.
We now introduce three more guard players m♭0ij , w♭0ij , d♭0ij so that in a stable match-
ing M ′ in Υ ′, m♭0ij can be matched to (w♭3ij , d♭3ij ). Suppose that (mi, wix, dix) ∈ T . The
preference of a doppleganger mij along with his twelve guard players are as follows.
– LW(mij) = w
g2
ij ≻ w
g1
ij ≻ wix ≻ w
♭0
ij ≻ · · ·
LD(mij) = d
g2
ij ≻ d
g1
ij ≻ dix ≻ d
♭0
ij ≻ · · ·
(pivot: (w♭0ij , d♭0ij ))
– LW(m
♭0
ij ) = w
♭3
ij ≻ · · ·
LD(m
♭0
ij ) = d
♭3
ij ≻ · · ·
– LM(w
♭0
ij ) = mij ≻ m
♭3
ij ≻ · · ·
LD(w
♭0
ij ) = d
♭0
ij ≻ · · ·
(pivot: (m♭3ij , d♭0ij ))
– LM(d
♭0
ij ) = mij ≻ m
♭3
ij ≻ · · ·
LW(d
♭0
ij ) = w
♭0
ij ≻ · · ·
(pivot: (m♭3ij , w♭0ij ))
– LW(m
♭3
ij ) = w
♭0
ij ≻ X ≻ · · ·
LD(m
♭3
ij ) = d
♭0
ij ≻ Y ≻ · · ·
(where X and Y are the simple lists of m♭3ij in Υ †ij .)
Moreover in the linear extension of poset LW(m♭3ij )×LD(m♭3ij ), we make (w♭0ij , d♭0ij ) ≻
Eπ({w
♭0
ij } × Y ) ≻ Eπ({w
♭0
ij } × (LD(m
♭3
ij ) − {d
♭0
ij ∪ Y }) ≻ Eπ(X × {d
♭0
ij }) ≻
F ≻ · · · ), where F is the same linear extension of X × Y given in Υ †ij .
Such a construction is allowed because of Lemma 2.
– LM(w
♭3
ij ) = X ≻ m
♭0
ij ≻ · · ·
LD(w
♭3
ij ) = Y ≻ · · ·
(where X and Y are the simple lists of w♭3ij in Υ †ij .)
Moreover, let the linear extension of LM(w♭3ij )× LD(w♭3ij ) be F ≻ Eπ({m♭0ij })×
Y ≻ · · · , where F is the same linear extension of X × Y given in Υ †ij .
– LM(d
♭3
ij ) = X ≻ m
♭0
ij ≻ · · ·
LW(d
♭3
ij ) = Y ≻ · · ·
(where X and Y are the simple lists of d♭3ij in Υ †ij .)
Moreover, let the linear extension of LM(d♭3ij ) × LD(d♭3ij ) be F ≻ Eπ({m♭0ij } ×
Y ) ≻ · · · , where F is the same linear extension of X × Y given in Υ †ij .
– For the remaining guard players p ∈ {m♭1ij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij ,m♭2ij , w♭2ij , d♭2ij }, assume that
her/his/its simple lists in Υ †ij are X and Y respectively. For the new simple lists
of p in the derived instance Υ ′, we attach all other players to the end of X and Y ,
respectively. Moreover, in the linear extension of the preference poset, we make the
extension of the (subposet) X × Y identical to the one given in Υ †ij , moreover, the
linear extension of X × Y precede all other elements.
Lemma 15. In a matching M ′ in the derived stable family problem instance Υ ′, if the
guard player m♭3ij is not matched to (w♭0ij , d♭0ij ), a triple containing three members from
the set {m♭1ij ,m♭2ij ,m♭3ij , w♭1ij , w♭2ij , w♭3ij , d♭1ij , d♭2ij , d♭3ij } blocks the stability of M ′. Con-
versely, if M ′ contains the following triple: {(m♭1ij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij ), (m♭2ij , w♭2ij , d♭2ij ),
(m♭0ij , w
♭3
ij , d
♭3
ij ), (m
♭3
ij , w
♭0
ij , d
♭0
ij )}, moreover, mij is matched to a woman and a dog
ranking higher than w♭0ij and d♭0ij respectively, then there is no blocking triple involv-
ing any of the twelve guard players of mij .
Proof. Suppose that m♭3ij is not matched to (w♭0ij , d♭0ij ). We first rule out the possibility
that m♭3ij is matched to one of them. W.l.o.g., let (m♭3ij , w♭0ij , dφ) ∈M ′, where dφ 6= d♭0ij .
Then (m♭3ij , w♭0ij , d♭0ij ) blocks M ′, as stated in the lemma.
So now we can assume that m♭3ij is matched to two players strictly ranking below
w♭0ij and d♭0ij respectively. We have two possible scenarios:
– All nine guard players of {m♭1ij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij ,m♭2ij , w♭2ij , d♭2ij ,m♭3ij , w♭3ij , d♭3ij } are matched
to one another in M ′. This situation is identical to a matching M †ij in Υ
†
ij . Since,
Υ †ij allows no stable matching, at least one blocking triple involving three out of
these nine guard players emerges to block M †ij , and also M ′.
– If some of these guard players are not matched to one another, then the situation is
identical to a matching M †ij in which at least three guard players (one from each
type of {M,W ,D}) are left unmatched in the instance Υ †ij . By the linear extensions
we have constructed, they would prefer one another and form a blocking triple to
M †ij , and also to M ′.
For the second part of the lemma, we can observe the following facts:
– (w♭0ij , d
♭0
ij ) dominates all other elements in the linear extension of m♭3ij ’s preference
poset. Hence m♭3ij has no incentive to go for any other players.
– (m♭3ij , d
♭0
ij ) is the pivot inw♭0ij ’s preference poset. Hence, the only better combination
for w♭0ij is (mij , d♭0ij ). But by the statement of the lemma, mij gets family members
ranking higher than w♭0ij and d♭0ij respectively, hence (mij , w♭0ij , d♭0ij ) cannot be a
blocking triple. The same argument can be applied to d♭0ij . So both w♭0ij and d♭0ij are
not part of a blocking triple.
– Consider woman w♭3ij . If she forms a blocking triple t with other players, there
are two possibilities. (1) She gets a better man in t. Such a man cannot be m♭3ij ,
as we argued previously. It can be verified that neither m♭1ij nor m♭2ij prefers the
combination of w♭3ij with any other dog player. (2) She gets the same man m♭0ij but
a better dog, which is either d♭1ij or d♭2ij . It can be checked that neither d♭1ij nor d♭2ij
prefers the combination of w♭3ij and m♭0ij (because of the way we construct the linear
extensions of their preference posets).
The same argument can be applied to dog d♭3ij . Also, m♭0ij is getting his best possible
combination. So he has no incentive to leave w♭3ij and d♭3ij either.
– The remaining players in the set {m♭1ij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij ,m♭2ij , w♭2ij , d♭2ij } do not form block-
ing triples, as can be easily verified. And this completes the proof of the second
part of the lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. In a stable matching M ′ of Υ ′, mij must have two players as family mem-
bers ranking higher than w♭0ij and d♭0ij in his simple lists, respectively.
Proof. The following case analysis shows that mij must get two family members rank-
ing higher than w♭0ij and d♭0ij respectively.
Table 4. An instance (where n = 3) of the stable family problem under the SOCL scheme that
disallows any stable matching.
Player Simple Lists Full Preference
m♭1ij LW(m
♭1
ij ) = w
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij w
♭1
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij d
♭3
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭3
ij ≻
LD(m
♭1
ij ) = d
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭3
ij w
♭3
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭3
ij
m♭2ij LW(m
♭1
ij ) = w
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij w
♭2
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭3
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭3
ij ≻
LD(m
♭2
ij ) = d
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭3
ij w
♭1
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij d
♭3
ij
m♭3ij LW(m
♭1
ij ) = w
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij w
♭1
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭1
ij d
♭3
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭2
ij d
♭3
ij ≻
LD(m
♭2
ij ) = d
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭3
ij w
♭3
ij d
♭2
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij d
♭3
ij
w♭1ij LD(w
♭1
ij ) = d
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭3
ij d
♭1
ijm
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭1
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭1
ijm
♭3
ij ≻ d
♭2
ijm
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭2
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭2
ijm
♭3
ij ≻
LM(w
♭1
ij ) = m
♭2
ij ≻ m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭3
ij d
♭3
ijm
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭3
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭3
ij d
♭3
ij
w♭2ij LD(w
♭2
ij ) = d
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭3
ij ≻ d
♭1
ij d
♭2
ijm
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭2
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭2
ijm
♭3
ij ≻ d
♭3
ijm
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭3
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭3
ijm
♭3
ij ≻
LM(w
♭1
ij ) = m
♭2
ij ≻ m
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭3
ij d
♭1
ijm
♭2
ij ≻ d
♭1
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭1
ij d
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♭3
ij ) = d
♭1
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LM(w
♭3
ij ) = m
♭2
ij ≻ m
♭1
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ijm
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♭3
ijm
♭1
ij ≻ d
♭3
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d♭1ij LM(d
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ij m
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ijw
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♭2
ijw
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭2
ijw
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ij ≻ m
♭3
ijw
♭2
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♭3
ijw
♭1
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LW(d
♭1
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ij ≻ w
♭1
ij ≻ w
♭3
ij m
♭3
ijw
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ij ≻ m
♭1
ijw
♭2
ij ≻ m
♭1
ijw
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ijw
♭3
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ijw
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ijw
♭1
ij ≻ m
♭1
ijw
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– If mij gets (wφ1, dφ2) and (at least) one of them ranks lower than w♭0ij and d♭0ij
respectively. Then by the fact that (w♭0ij , d♭0ij ) is the pivot, mij must prefer them,
and so do they him, creating a blocking triple to M ′, a contradiction.
– Suppose that mij gets only one of w♭0ij and d♭0ij as family members. We claim that
(m♭3ij , w
♭0
ij , d
♭0
ij ) is a blocking triple. This follows from the fact that (m♭3ij , d♭0ij ) and
(m♭3ij , w
♭0
ij ) are pivots in w♭0ij ’s and d♭0ij ’s preference posets respectively.
– Suppose (mij , w♭0ij , d♭0ij ) ∈ M ′. Then m♭3ij cannot get (w♭0ij , d♭0ij ) in M ′ and we can
apply Lemma 15 to show M ′ is unstable.
By the above discussion, in M ′, mij must get both family members ranking higher
than w♭0ij and d♭0ij respectively, and this gives us the lemma. ⊓⊔
We now summarize the preferences of the players in the set X = M1 ∪ M2 ∪
M3 ∪W
g
1 ∪W
g
2 ∪W ∪D
g
1 ∪D
g
2 ∪D in Table 5. As can be seen, their preferences are
similar to those we used in Section 3. The major difference is that now each garbage
collector also needs her/its own guard players. Consider any garbage collector p ∈
{Wg1 ∪W
g
2 ∪D
g
1∪D
g
2}. We introduce the symbolsm⋆(p),w⋆(p), and d⋆(p) to represent
her/its three associate guard players. Their purpose will be clear in the proofs below.
When we create the linear extension of the preference poset of a player in X =
M1 ∪M2 ∪M3 ∪ W
g
1 ∪W
g
2 ∪ D
g
1 ∪ D
g
2 , supposing that Y and Z are those players
ranking at least as high as their guard players, we let all elements in Y × Z precede all
other elements (using Lemma 2) in the linear extensions.
Lemma 17. Suppose that a stable matching M ′ exists in the derived stable family in-
stance Υ ′. Consider the garbage collectors wgi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i1, d
g
i2 created for man mi ∈M.
Then wgi1 and d
g
i1 belong to the same triple t1 ∈ M ′ and w
g
i2 and d
g
i2 belong to the
same triple t2 ∈ M ′. Moreover, in t1 and t2, the third family member must be one of
the dopplegangers mi1,mi2,mi3.
Proof. We argue first for the case of wgi2. Suppose t2 = (mφ1, wgi2, dφ1) and dφ1 6= dgi2.
There are two subcases.
– If dφ1 = d⋆(wgi2) and mφ1 6= m⋆(w
g
i2), then (m⋆(w
g
i2), w
⋆(wgi2), d
⋆(wgi2)) blocks
M ′, a contradiction.
– If dφ1 = d⋆(wgi2) and mφ1 = m⋆(w
g
i2), then (mi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i2) blocks M ′, again a
contradiction.
– If dφ1 6= d⋆(wgi2), then (m⋆(w
g
i2), w
g
i2, d
⋆(wgi2)) blocks M ′. (This is because the
combination of the garbage collectors (m⋆(wgi2), d⋆(wgi2)) is the pivot of wgi2’s lin-
ear extension). So we have another contradiction.
Thus we have dφ1 = dgi2. If mφ1 6∈ {mi1,mi2,mi3}, then (mi1, w
g
i2, d
g
i2) blocks
M ′.
The case of t1 being composed of wgi1, d
g
i1 and another doppleganger mij follows
analogous argument. Therefore, we have the lemma. ⊓⊔
By the previous two lemmas, we establish
Lemma 18. (Sufficiency) If there exists a stable matching M ′ in the derived stable
family problem instance Υ ′, there exists a perfect matching M in the original three-
dimensional matching instance Υ .
We need another lemma to show the necessity.
Lemma 19. In a matching M ′ in the derived stable family problem instance Υ ′, sup-
pose the garbage collectors ofmi are matched to two of the dopplegangers ofmi, while
the remaining doppleganger mij is matched to a real woman and a real dog with whom
mi shares a triple in T in the original three-dimensional instance Υ . Then there is no
blocking triple in which the dopplegangers mi1,mi2,mi3, are involved.
Proof. We assume that {(mi1, wgi2, dgi2), (mi2, wgi1, dgi1), (mi3, wic, dic)} ⊂M ′. Other
cases follow analogous arguments.
We claim that there does not exist a blocking triple of the form (mij , wgi1, dφ1),
(mij , w
g
i2, d
φ2), (mij , w
φ3, dgi1), and (mij , wφ4, d
g
i2) where dφ1 6= d
g
i1, d
φ2 6= dgi2,
wφ3 6= wgi1, and wφ4 6= w
g
i2. We only consider the first case. By the way we construct
the linear extension of the preference poset of wgi1, she will prefer her original combi-
nation (mi2, dgi1) over such a combination. Hence, (mij , w
g
i1, d
φ1), where dφ1 6= dgi1,
cannot block M ′.
So we only need to consider the three following potential blocking triples:
(mi2, w
g
i2, d
g
i2), (mi3, w
g
i2, d
g
i2), (mi3, w
g
i1, d
g
i1). It can be easily verified that they do not
block M because that the order of the three dopplegangers in the simple lists of wgi1 and
dgi1 (and also wgi2, dgi2) are reversed. ⊓⊔
Lemma 20. (Necessity) Suppose that there is a perfect matching M in the original
three-dimensional matching instance Υ . Then there also exists a stable matching M ′ in
the derived stable family instance Υ ′.
Proof. We build a stable matching M ′ in the derived stable family instance Υ ′ based
on M .
Suppose that (mi, wix, dix) ∈M . Let the doppleganger who listswix and dix above
his guard players to be matched to wix and dix, and the other two dopplegangers be
matched to the garbage collectors. The twelve guard players of mij are matched to one
another as follows: {(m♭1ij , w♭1ij , d♭1ij ), (m♭2ij , w♭2ij , d♭2ij ), (m♭0ij , w♭3ij , d♭3ij ), (m♭3ij , w♭0ij , d♭0ij )};
for any garbage collector p ∈ Wg1 ∪W
g
2 ∪D
g
1 ∪D
g
2 , we make her/its three guard players
(m⋆(p), w⋆(p), d⋆(p)) a triple.
By Lemma 15, it can be seen that none of the guard players of dopplegangers will
form blocking triples. Similarly, by Lemma 19, the dopplegangers will not be involved
in blocking triples either. Also, since all garbage collectors are matched to players rank-
ing higher than their guard players, their guard players also will not form blocking
triples either. Combining the above facts, we complete the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔
Letting n = |M| = |W| = |D|, we use in all 3n dopplegangers, 4n garbage
collectors, 48n guard players, 2n real women and real dogs. Therefore, the reduction
can be done in polynomial time. Checking whether a matching is stable also can be
done in O(n3) time. We conclude the stable family part of Theorem 3.
Table 5. The preference lists of all players in the set X = M1∪M2∪M3∪Wg1∪W
g
2∪W∪D
g
1∪
Dg2 ∪D. We assume that there exist three triples (mi, wia, dia), (mi, wib, dib), (mi, wic, dic) in
T . For p ∈ {Wg1 ∪W
g
2 ∪D
g
1 ∪D
g
2}, their linear extension should guarantee that all elements in
Y × Z precede all other elements, where Y and Z are those players ranking at least as high as
their guard players in their simple lists.
Player Simple Lists Pivot
mi1 ∈ M1 LW (mi1)=w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wia ≻ w
♭0
i1 ≻ · · · (w
♭0
i1 , d
♭0
i1)
LD(mi1) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dia ≻ d
♭0
i1 ≻ · · ·
mi2 ∈ M2 LW (mi2)=w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wib ≻ w
♭0
i2 ≻ · · · (w
♭0
i2 , d
♭0
i2)
LD(mi2) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dib ≻ d
♭0
i1 ≻ · · ·
mi3 ∈ M3 LW (mi3)=w
g
i2 ≻ w
g
i1 ≻ wic ≻ w
♭0
i3 ≻ · · · (w
♭0
i3 , d
♭0
i3)
LD(mi3) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
g
i1 ≻ dic ≻ d
♭0
i3 ≻ · · ·
w
g
i1 ∈ W
g
1 LM(w
g
i1) = mi3 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi1 ≻ m
⋆(wgi1) ≻ · · · (m
⋆(wgi1), d
⋆(wgi1))
LD(w
g
i1) = d
g
i1 ≻ d
⋆(wgi1) ≻ · · ·
w
g
i2 ∈ W
g
2 LM(w
g
i2) = mi3 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi1 ≻ m
⋆(wgi2) ≻ · · · (m
⋆(wgi2), d
⋆(wgi2))
LD(w
g
i2) = d
g
i2 ≻ d
⋆(wgi2) ≻ · · ·
d
g
i1 ∈ D
g
1 LM(d
g
i1) = mi1 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi3 ≻ m
⋆(dgi1) ≻ · · · (m
⋆(dgi1), w
⋆(dgi1))
LW (d
g
i1) = w
g
i1 ≻ w
⋆(wgi1) ≻ · · ·
d
g
i2 ∈ D
g
2 LM(d
g
i2) = mi1 ≻ mi2 ≻ mi3 ≻ m
⋆(dgi2) ≻ · · · (m
⋆(dgi2), w
⋆(dgi2))
LW (w
g
i2) = w
g
i2 ≻ w
⋆(wgi2) ≻ · · ·
w ∈ W LM(w) = · · ·
LD(w) = · · ·
d ∈ D LM(d) = · · ·
LW (d) = · · ·
m⋆(w) LW (m
⋆(w)) = w ≻ w⋆(w) ≻ · · · (w⋆(w), d⋆(w))
w ∈ {wgi1, w
g
i2} LD(m
⋆(w)) = d⋆(w) ≻ · · ·
w⋆(w) LM(w
⋆(w)) = m⋆(w) ≻ · · ·
w ∈ {wgi1, w
g
i2} LD(w
⋆(w)) = d⋆(w) ≻ · · ·
d⋆(w) LM(d
⋆(w)) = m⋆(w) ≻ · · · (m⋆(w), w⋆(w))
w ∈ {wgi1, w
g
i2} LW (d
⋆(w)) = w ≻ w⋆(w) ≻ · · ·
m⋆(d) LW (m
⋆(d)) = w⋆(d) ≻ · · · (w⋆(d), d⋆(d))
d ∈ {dgi1, d
g
i2} LD(m
⋆(d)) = d ≻ d⋆(d) ≻ · · ·
w⋆(d) LM(w
⋆(w)) = m⋆(d) ≻ · · · (m⋆(d), d⋆(d))
d ∈ {dgi1, d
g
i2} LD(w
⋆(w)) = d ≻ d⋆(d) ≻ · · ·
d⋆(d) LM(d
⋆(d)) = m⋆(d) ≻ · · ·
d ∈ {dgi1, d
g
i2} LW (d
⋆(d)) = d⋆(d) ≻ · · ·
